The predictive strength of MBS yield spreads during asset bubbles by Deku, SY et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-020-00888-8
1 3
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
The predictive strength of MBS yield spreads during asset 
bubbles
Solomon Y. Deku2 · Alper Kara1  · Artur Semeyutin3
 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
We examine whether the predictive power of initial yield spreads of mortgage-backed secu-
rities (MBS) vary with the financial cycle. Using a cross-country sample of 4203 MBS, 
we find that initial yield spreads of MBS incorporate more information than credit ratings 
and predict future downgrades, even after conditioning on initial credit ratings. Predictive 
power of spreads is higher during credit and housing bubbles and for the least risky AAA-
rated MBS. We find that initial yield spreads capture the magnitude of rating downgrades, 
especially during asset bubble periods. As a novel approach in this literature, we also uti-
lise machine learning techniques (regression trees, naïve Bayes, support vector machines 
and random forests) to confirm our results.
Keywords Securitization · MBS pricing · Credit ratings · Asset bubbles · Machine learning
JEL Classification G21 · G28
1 Introduction
Demand for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) climbed in the years leading to the 
2007–2009 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) as these bonds offered higher yields and required 
lower capital charges. Strong demand created an incentive for issuing banks to create 
more of these highly rated securities from low-quality loans and to relax lending standards 
(Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011; Keys et al. 2010; Nadauld and Sherlund 2013). Further-
more, misaligned incentives and imperfect information in the securitization chain reduced 
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lending banks’ incentives to collect soft information, and to perform their screening and 
monitoring functions efficiently (Rajan et al. 2015). Credit ratings were also systematically 
biased. Rating agencies granted relative rating favours to larger issuers and issuers that 
offered them significant bilateral securitization business (Efing and Hau 2015; He et  al. 
2016).
Consequently, investors suffered significant losses during the 2007–2009 financial crisis 
(Watson 2008). They were criticised for being overly reliant on credit ratings when evaluat-
ing risks embedded in MBS (Mählmann 2012). Evidently, credit ratings did not reliably 
cover the risk profile of debt tranches, hence tranche pricing based exclusively on credit 
ratings created perverse incentives for issuers to exploit this unpriced risk (Mählmann 
2016).1 However, empirical evidence also show that prices of MBS accounted for incen-
tive problems and other critical factors as well as credit ratings. For example, Fabozzi and 
Vink (2015) find that initial yield spreads of European MBS reflected rating risk and, even 
after conditioning on assigned credit ratings at issuance, yields of European MBS issues 
accounted for factors such as tranche seniority, nature of collateral and external credit 
enhancement (Fabozzi and Vink 2012a, b). In the US, investors priced the probability of 
rating shopping where pessimistic ratings are suppressed as yield spreads predicted losses 
on single-rated tranches while ratings could not (He et al. 2016). Spreads on equally rated 
US MBSs were higher for larger issuers signalling that investors perceived inflated ratings 
to be correlated with issuer size. Deku et al. (2019) find that engaging reputable trustees 
in securitization transactions led to lower spreads, and trustees’ reputation became more 
important when risk assessment was more challenging due to several layers of misaligned 
incentives in the securitisation chain.
Overall, this strand of the literature shows that investors attempted to incorporate the 
potential costs of misaligned interests beyond the informative content of ratings into initial 
MBS prices. Empirical evidence shows that yield spreads of US MBS at issuance were 
reliable predictors of both future downgrades and defaults. The ability of yield spreads to 
predict future performance in terms of future defaults and rating downgrades is stronger for 
lower rated, information-sensitive MBS (Adelino 2009; He et al. 2016).
In this paper, we investigate whether the predictive power of initial MBS yield spreads 
varies with the financial cycle,2 a question that has not been addressed in the existing lit-
erature. There is empirical evidence in support of significant herding tendencies among 
institutional investors during asset bubbles. Furthermore, institutional trading patterns can 
generate short-term price pressures which worsen asset bubbles (Singh 2013). Nonetheless, 
theoretical models predict that institutional investors are likely to identify asset bubbles 
(Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003; De Long et al. 1990; Sato 2016).3 Thus, some institutional 
investors become aware of developing bubbles due to mispricing; however, the inability 
1 For example, Lin et al. (2013) find that in terms of tranche-specific risk-adjusted returns BBB and BB 
tranches possess the lowest risk-adjusted returns in comparison to other rated tranches.
2 In this paper, we prefer to use Financial Cycle rather than the Business Cycle as recent economic lit-
erature argue that former may not always correlate with the latter (Aikman et  al. 2015; Claessens et  al. 
2012; Drehmann et al. 2012) and properties of financial cycles may be different from those of regular busi-
ness cycles (Rünstler 2016). Financial cycle refers to the self-reinforcing interactions between perceptions 
of value and risk, risk-taking, and financing constraints within an economy (Borio 2014). House prices and 
credit volumes are two key financial cycle variables, as historical evidence suggests that many financial cri-
ses have been preceded by credit and housing booms (Jordà et al. 2016).
3 See Scherbina and Schlusche (2014) for a literature survey on how and why asset bubbles develop and 
persist.
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to show coordinated arbitrage allows the bubble to expand and encourages them to “ride” 
the bubble instead. Empirical studies find evidence supporting this argument. For example, 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that during the technology bubble of the late 1990s, 
hedge funds reduced their holdings of technology shares before prices collapsed. Hedge 
fund managers understood that prices would eventually decline but exploited this oppor-
tunity by fuelling the bubble.4 Griffin et al. (2011) find that the most sophisticated inves-
tors actively purchased technology stocks during the run-up to the technology bubble, and 
quickly reversed course in March 2000 before the bubble burst. Our arguments rely loosely 
on this literature. We posit that institutional MBS investors are capable of detecting asset 
bubbles and revising their valuations accordingly.
We hypothesize that the information content of initial yield spreads, regarding MBS 
quality, should be more apparent during bubble periods. This is because investors would 
expect a decline in the quality of mortgages lent in these periods. Asset bubble phases are 
characterised by high credit growth rates while contractions are associated with negative 
credit growth and higher loan losses. Consequently, credit booms tend to precede periods 
of severe fall in credit quality (Caporale et al. 2014). We use two measures for asset bub-
bles: (1) the credit bubble period commonly observed between 2005 and the first half of 
2007 in Europe, and (2) house price bubbles observed in individual countries between the 
period of 1999 and 2007.
We examine whether the information content of initial yield spreads vary between 
normal and asset bubble periods using a sample of 4203 MBS issued in twelve Western 
European countries. We find that MBS prices at issuance predict future downgrades due to 
deterioration in quality, after conditioning on initial credit ratings. The predictive power of 
spreads is higher during the asset bubble periods and for AAA-rated MBS. Furthermore, 
within the AAA category, spreads also predict the magnitude of credit rating downgrades. 
Our findings show that initial yield spreads of MBS incorporated additional information 
in excess of credit ratings. The results are robust to accounting for both types of asset bub-
bles (i.e. credit and housing), the severity of information asymmetries in MBS (such as 
rating disagreements) and possible endogeneity bias that may arise due to our modelling 
approach. Furthermore, we utilised machine learning (ML) techniques (regression trees, 
naïve Bayes, support vector machines and random forests), a novel approach in this litera-
ture, to check robustness of our results. Overall, the results from these methods confirm the 
predictive property of initial yield spreads.
Our contribution to the literature is fourfold. Firstly, we examine whether the predictive 
power of initial yield spreads differs depending on the financial cycle. The existing literature 
finds that yield spreads are reliable predictors of future performance, and credit ratings do 
not seem to capture all the risks embedded in MBS (Adelino 2009; He et al. 2016). He et al. 
(2016) also reports that the predictive power of yields for future losses was stronger during the 
period of 2004–2006 (i.e. the pre-crisis period), when the US market was at its peak. How-
ever, we do not know whether this predictive power differs in certain economic periods, espe-
cially during housing bubbles. Differing from previous studies, rather than only relying on the 
4 There is also research on securitization agents (such as managing directors, vice presidents of major 
investment houses and boutique firms working in the securitization industry) personal investments in the 
US during the housing bubble preceding the 2007–2009 crisis (Cheng et al. 2014). They find little system-
atic evidence that the average securitization agent exhibited awareness of the bubble through their home 
transactions. However, their study does not examine the positions of institutional investors.
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period of credit growth prior to the GFC, we contribute to the literature by identifying housing 
bubbles in each country to test the predictive power of spreads.
Secondly, we utilise a comprehensive dataset to capture the cross-country variation in MBS 
pricing. A key limitation of earlier studies on MBS yield spreads predictability of future per-
formance is the focus on a single market, i.e. US (Adelino 2009; He et al. 2016). We contrib-
ute to the literature providing the first evidence outside the US using an international sample. 
Hence our results cannot be ascribed to any individual institutional or regulatory features idi-
osyncratic to any single country. We contribute to the literature by capturing housing bubbles 
across multiple countries. This is important as our data shows that housing bubbles in different 
neighbouring countries do not necessarily coincide with each other.
Thirdly, we provide the first evidence on the predictive value of the initial yield spreads of 
European MBSs. Despite being the second largest market after the US, the European market 
has received considerably less research attention. This is important because the evolution and 
the institutional framework of the European securitization market significantly differ from the 
US equivalent. First, unlike the US, where the Government Sponsored Enterprises (such as 
the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) are dominant market players, there is limited government 
involvement in the European market, which is purely driven by private institutions. Secondly, 
even though the US securitization market has been active since the late 1960s, the develop-
ment of the European market has been relatively recent and has been attributed to the intro-
duction of the Euro in the late 1990s (Altunbas et al. 2009; Kara et al. 2016). Against this 
backdrop, investors may have been exposed to higher information asymmetries. As a result, 
they may have been more cautious when assessing and pricing European MBS. Therefore, we 
also contribute to the literature by testing the predictive power of initial MBS yield spreads, 
and its possible variation with the financial cycle, in the European securitization market.
Finally, we contribute to the literature by introducing ML techniques for the first time in 
securitization relevant literature. Specifically, we utilise classification trees, naïve Bayes algo-
rithm, support vector machines (SVM), and random forest (RF) algorithms. Different com-
binations of these methods alongside logistic regression analysis have recently gained wide 
attention in the banking and finance literature. For example, Chen (2011) combine regression 
trees with logistic regression to analyse and predict corporate financial distress. Tanaka et al. 
(2016) develop an early warning RF framework for bank failures and Tanaka et al. (2019) also 
use RF to predict industry level financial bankruptcy. Mercadier and Lardy (2019) employ RF 
to approximate credit default swaps to assess default risk of companies when these financial 
derivatives are not available. We hope that our study would encourage researchers in bond 
pricing and performance literature to use ML based approaches, as generally advocated by 
Varian (2014).
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and 
our empirical strategy. Results are presented in Sect. 3 in four sub-sections: credit and housing 
bubble, the magnitude of downgrade and robustness checks. In Sect. 4 we present results from 
ML analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2  Data and methodology
2.1  Data
We collect deal and tranche level data from Dealogic and Bloomberg on 4203 MBS issued 
in twelve European countries between 1999 and June 2007. These countries include 
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Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The cut-off date is chosen to circumvent the mini-
mal investor appetite for securitizations after June 2007 as the market volume had declined 
significantly as the financial crisis unfolded. Furthermore, originators have largely retained 
post-2007 European issuances rather than issue them to private investors. According to 
data published by Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), issuing 
banks were only able to place 36% of all issuances between July and December of 2007, 
13% in 2008 and only 6% in 2009.
2.2  Empirical model
Although recent evidence (Fabozzi and Vink 2012a, b, 2015; He et al. 2016) indicates that 
investors incorporated a variety of factors into pricing MBS, credit ratings are the single 
most important determinant of bond prices at origination. Structured finance credit ratings 
are forward-looking credit opinions that account for credit risk of the underlying assets, 
structural risk and counterparty risk. We also assume that ratings account for delinquency 
rates. However, structural features can be engineered to stave off rating downgrades. For 
instance, high levels of credit support can result in the maintenance or upgrade of an exist-
ing credit rating. Therefore, credit ratings measure the expected performance of the under-
lying assets as well as structural features. Given that there is no organised secondary mar-
ket for MBS, pricing data is very scant. Therefore, we rely on credit rating downgrades as a 
measure of deterioration in at least one or more of these dimensions.
Following Adelino (2009)’s specification, our baseline logistic model to estimate the 
probability of downgrade of bond i as follows:
where Downgrade equals to 1 if the credit rating of the tranche is adjusted downwards 
(with the latest observation point of 31 December 2014) relative to the rating awarded 
at issuance by at least one of the three largest credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch), and 0 if rating is maintained or upgraded. We collect credit ratings at 
issuance and rating changes of all bonds and convert the ratings to a numerical point scale, 
where AAA/Aaa = 1, AA +/Aa1 = 2 and so on. Thus, downgrade is defined as a negative 
migration to a lower rating, for instance from AAA to AA+. Downgrades are typically 
triggered by adverse changes in credit risk, counterparty risk or structural risk associated 
with how the deal was engineered. Spread is the log of spread at issuance in excess of the 
pricing benchmark, i.e. 3 m Euribor. We use yield spreads as a predictor that subsumes the 
effects of deal, tranche, issuer and other macro-economic characteristics. We restrict the 
sample to floating rate tranches to circumvent the difficulties associated with estimating a 
log
(P(Downgrade = 1|x))
1 − P(Downgrade = 1|x) =훽0 + 훽1Spreadi + 훽2Bubblec,t,i + 훽3Bubblec,t,i × Spreadi
+ 훽4WeightedAverageLifei +
K−1∑
k=1
훽k × CreditRatingk,i
+
Y−1∑
y=1
훽y × Yeary,i
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consistent benchmark yield curve for each fixed rate tranche, and to tranches issued at par 
to preclude distortions of discounts or premiums on the actual yield spreads.5
We use two alternative variables for Bubble. Credit Bubble captures the credit growth 
period prior to the GFC. This variable equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the boom 
period of 2005 and first half of 2007, and 0 otherwise. We utilise the interaction—Credit 
Bubble × Spread—to capture the predictive ability of yield spreads during the credit bubble 
period.
Housing bubble is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there was a house price bubble in 
the country (c) during the year (t) when the MBS is issued, and 0 otherwise. Housing Bub-
ble is based on price-rent ratios. Bourassa et al. (2019), comparing seven alternative meth-
ods to identify house price bubble periods, suggest that the price-rent ratio measure is a 
reliable measure both ex-post and in real time. A house price bubble is identified when the 
price-rent ratio for a certain year exceeds its long-term average by 20%. We collect housing 
price data from the OECD’s housing database and calculate the long-term average of price-
rent ratio for each country for the period between 1970 and 2016.6 In Fig. 1 we present the 
identified housing bubble periods for each country. We use the interaction of spreads and 
bubble—Housing Bubble  × Spread—to examine the predictive power of yield spread dur-
ing housing bubble periods.
Weighted average life is computed as the weighted average time until each monetary 
unit of principal of the relevant tranche is repaid. We use Weighted Average Life to control 
for interest rate risk exposure. This variable also accounts for prepayment risk and there-
fore will always be shorter than the nominal maturity of the underlying mortgages.
Credit ratings are a set of dummy variables indicating the credit rating of the tranche 
at the issuance. Following the literature, we use composite credit ratings, reported by 
Dealogic, that combine the credit ratings from different rating agencies for each tranche 
(Campbell and Taksler 2003; Cuchra 2004; Fabozzi and Vink 2015). We assume that the 
composite credit ratings assigned at the issuance capture the expected default frequency of 
tranches.
Fig. 1  Housing bubble periods in the sample countries
5 We lose approximately 1% of the initial sample due to this filter.
6 The data is only available from 1977 for Belgium and Greece, 1988 for Portugal, 1971 for Spain, and 
1980 for Sweden.
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We also include year fixed effects in all specifications to capture prevailing macroeco-
nomic conditions. Our model exploits cross-sectional and within-entity time variation. It 
is unlikely that tranches within a specific deal are independent of each other; for instance, 
the ratings on multiple tranches tend to be modified around the same time (Adelino 2009). 
Therefore, the reported standard errors are clustered at the deal level to mitigate the corre-
lation of errors within cross-sectional clusters (Cuchra 2004).
2.3  ML methods: classification trees, Naïve Bayes, support vector machines 
and random forests
We also employ several alternative ML methods to examine the initial spreads’ predic-
tive strength of MBS downgrade outcomes. These are classification trees (from rpart R 
package) (Therneau et al. 2015), naïve Bayes algorithm (from naivebayes R package) 
(Majka 2019), support vector machines (SVM) classification (from e1071 R package) 
(David et  al. 2019), random forest (RF) (from randomForest R package) (Liaw and 
Wiener 2002) and gradient boosting (GB) algorithms (from XGBoost and EIX R pack-
ages) (Karbowiak and Biecek 2020). Different combinations of these methods along-
side logistic regression analysis have recently gained wide attention in the finance lit-
erature (see for example: Chen 2011; Mercadier and Lardy 2019; Tanaka et al. 2016, 
2019). Our aim here is to apply these innovative machine-driven techniques to assess 
the reliability of our findings.
In our MBS setting, classification trees target creating a sequence of rules to reach 
a decision (either to downgrade or not to downgrade an MBS) by performing recur-
sive tests on the MBS outcome variable (Downgrade). This splits downgrade and no 
downgrade space of MBS into the areas with clear decision boundaries of different 
shapes. If classification problem is complex, trees are not always stable in the out-of-
sample (testing) phase and suffer from high variance problem in estimations. This can 
be resolved by building a forest (large number) of trees over the bootstrapped samples 
from a sub-set of training data and considering a random sub-set of variables at each 
split. This ensures diversity in each tree, reduces variance and is commonly known as 
RF procedure.
Naïve Bayes is a comparatively more straightforward approach. It aims at construct-
ing the probability of each MBS outcome with Bayes’ rule given the data, and is based 
on the naive variables’ independence assumption. However, SVM is a more techni-
cally involved procedure than Naïve Bayes. It constructs a hyperplane to separate MBS 
outcomes into groups of downgraded and not-downgraded securities. SVM algorithm 
maximizes the distance between closest observations in the MBS groups and offers lin-
ear and nonlinear hyperplane separations. Holopainen and Sarlin (2017), Beutel et al. 
(2019), and Colombo and Pelagatti (2020) describe ML algorithms that we employ 
with in detail, and the most comprehensive technical guide is provided by Hastie et al. 
(2009). Overall, ML algorithms are nonparametric, because they do not make strong 
assumptions about the data and are flexible to identify variable interactions as well as 
linear and nonlinear patterns in the sample. However, large data sets are required to 
exercise modelling power of ML approaches. Moreover, Beutel et al. (2019) argue that 
ML tools do not necessarily void the relevance, competitiveness and out-of-sample 
superiority of the logistic regression and other standard tools. On the other hand, in the 
context of the exchange rate forecasting, Colombo and Pelagatti (2020) point out that 
due to extreme flexibility, ML can serve as a sophisticated version of technical analysis 
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and unpack patterns of non-fundamental determinants, non-rational market behaviour 
and market interventions by regulators. Beutel et  al. (2019) also argue that ML pro-
vide modelling benefits over the common binary logistic regression. To improve our 
understanding of the processes behind MBS credit rating downgrades, and enhance the 
interpretability of our results, we present intuitive visualisations of the ML output.
2.4  Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1 Panel A. The mean spread is 
65.9 basis points (bp). The average tranche size is €228 million with a weighted average 
life of 5.5  years. In Panel B we present the descriptive statistics for bubble and normal 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
Panel A
Variables N Mean SD 25th pctl Median 75th pctl
Spread (basis points) 4203 65.9 90.5 18.0 33.0 70.0
Weighted average life (years) 4203 5.5 3.0 3.8 5.1 7.0
Tranche value (Euro million) 4203 228.0 452.0 20.4 47.4 232.0
Panel B
Variables Credit bubble Housing bubble
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Spread (basis points) 2594 57.9 91.1 2917 60.1 90.7
Weighted average life (years) 2594 5.3 3.0 2917 5.3 3.0
Tranche value (Euro million) 2594 238.0 489.0 2917 241.0 487.0
No credit bubble No housing bubble
Spread (basis points) 1609 78.8 87.9 1286 79.1 88.4
Weighted average life (years) 1609 5.7 2.9 1286 5.8 2.9
Tranche value (Euro million) 1609 212.0 386.0 1286 198.0 360.0
Panel C
Credit rating N Downgraded 
(%)
Mean spread Credit rating N Downgraded 
(%)
Mean spread
AAA 1578 35.2 18.1 BB+ 32 46.9 271.1
AA+ 53 62.3 31.6 BB 173 57.8 315.5
AA 567 41.4 31.8 BB− 29 65.5 303.4
AA− 85 45.9 36.8 B+ 2 100.0 562.5
A+ 84 42.9 50.5 B 17 76.5 584.1
A 644 34.3 56.2 CCC+ 2 0.0 350.0
A− 45 57.8 51.0 CCC 1 0.0 350.0
BBB+ 68 41.2 90.3 CCC− 17 82.4 308.4
BBB 675 36.3 104.8 CC 10 80.0 372.0
BBB− 120 55.8 104.9 C 1 0.0 400.0
Total 4203 39.4 65.9
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periods separately. We observe that in asset bubble periods (either credit or housing) 
spreads are lower, maturities are shorter and issuance volumes are larger for MBS. These 
findings reflect the typical signs observed during asset bubble periods. In Panel C we pre-
sent descriptive statistics for downgrade ratio and spread per rating category. In the sample, 
AAA-rated bonds and non-AAA investment grade (between AA + and BBB−) bonds con-
stitute 37.5% and 55.7% of the sample, respectively. Only 6.70% of bonds are classified as 
non-investment grade. Secondly, as one would expect, a sharp increase in spreads is notice-
able from 104.9 to 271.1 bp between the lowest rating level of investment grade (BBB−) 
and highest rating level of non-investment grade (BB +) categories. Accordingly, we esti-
mate the models first for the full sample and subsequently for the sub-categories of AAA, 
non-AAA investment grade and non-investment grade (< BBB−) bonds separately. This 
should enable us to observe the predictive power of initial yield spreads along the credit 
quality spectrum as the severity of information asymmetries increases from high rated to 
lower-rated bonds.
3  Results of regression analysis
We present results below for the credit bubble and subsequently for the housing bubble 
estimations. We estimate the models first for the full sample and then for AAA, non-AAA 
investment grade and non-investment grade (< BBB−) subsamples to examine whether the 
predictability of initial yield spreads vary by risk levels of the MBS bonds.
3.1  Credit bubble
Results for Credit Bubble are reported in Table 2. In column 1, we estimate the regression 
for the full sample. Controlling for assigned credit rating at issuance, we find that Spread 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, showing that bonds with higher prices 
at origination are more likely to be downgraded in the future. This finding is in line with 
Adelino (2009) and He et al. (2016). The coefficient of Credit Bubble is also positive and 
significant, indicating that bonds issued during the credit growth period of 2005 and June 
2007 were more likely to be downgraded subsequently, perhaps due to originating banks’ 
lax lending standards during this period (Du 2019; Rajan et  al. 2015) or their reduced 
incentives for monitoring (Kara et al. 2019). Similar results are reported by He et al. (2016) 
for the US.
In column 2, we introduce the Credit Bubble x Spread interaction which captures 
whether the predictive power of initial spreads differ between the credit bubble and normal 
periods. We find a positive and significant coefficient for Credit Bubble × Spread, which 
shows that spreads at origination have more predictive power concerning future down-
grades for MBS issued during a credit bubble period. For the full sample, on average, a 
1 bp increase in spreads raises the odds of a downgrade by 1.31% and 0.6% during the 
credit bubble and normal periods, respectively. In other words, the predictive power of 
spreads doubles during the credit bubble periods.
In columns 3 we present the results for AAA-rated MBS only. We find similar results 
in terms of the direction of the coefficients but with larger magnitudes. Spreads at origina-
tion have a larger predictive power of future downgrades for AAA bonds in comparison 
to the full sample. This finding is in stark contrast with the literature. Using US data, He 
et al. (2016) finds initial spreads having a weaker predictive power for AAA-rated MBS 
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and Adelino (2009) reports no predictive power. We find that spreads on investment-grade 
securities are highly informative and have significant predictive power. This is especially 
evident during periods associated with credit bubbles and high issuance levels. Thus, the 
informativeness of these spreads is conditional on market activity. Hence, the predictive 
potency of initial yield spreads is more influential during credit booms when credit stand-
ards are perceived to be falling. This is consistent with the perception that, compared to the 
US, underwriting standards in Europe are relatively robust. European structured finance 
suffered a default rate of 0.95% between 2007 and 2010, compared to 7.7% for US issu-
ances and 6.34% for global corporate bonds (Blommestein et  al. 2011). Furthermore, 
although spreads on non-investment grade tranches can also predict downgrades, we find 
no evidence of cyclical adjustment, indicating that investors tend to have significant predic-
tive power regardless of issuance levels or the credit cycle.
In column 4 we introduce the Credit Bubble × Spread interaction, which is also signifi-
cant with a much larger impact. Investors seem to rely more on credit ratings during the 
normal economic periods by adjusting the spreads less. However, during the bubble peri-
ods, they reflect risk sentiments on the initial yield spreads at the pricing stage over the 
risk assigned by the credit rating. Our results show that a 1 bp higher origination spread 
increases the odds of a downgrade by 12.2% for AAA-rated MBS during a bubble period. 
In normal periods, this predictive power declines to only 0.5%.
In column 5 we estimate the model for non-AAA investment grade MBS (< BBB−). 
Although the magnitude of the coefficients is lower, compared to the AAA sample, our 
earlier findings concerning predictability still stand. In column 6 we find that Credit Bub-
ble × Spread is also significant. However, unlike the AAA estimations, the coefficient of 
Spread is statistically significant. This shows that when valuing non-AAA investment 
grade bonds, investors are less likely to rely on credit ratings, even during the normal eco-
nomic periods. In other words, they are more cautious when valuing riskier bonds.
Results for the riskiest non-investment grade MBS is shown in columns 7 and 8. Spread 
and Credit Bubble remain significant with slightly lower explanatory power. However, we 
do not find the interaction of the two variables to be significant (column 8). This shows 
that for the lower quality MBS, spreads are likely to predict the future performance but this 
relationship does not differ between the bubble and normal periods.
3.2  Housing bubble
Results for Housing Bubble are presented in Table 3 for the full sample in columns 1 and 
2. Similar to the results reported above, Spread is statistically significant and has a positive 
sign in predicting the likelihood of downgrade. The coefficient of Housing Bubble is insig-
nificant, indicating that the likelihood of downgrade does not differ between MBS issued 
during housing bubbles and normal periods. Subsequently, we look at the result for the 
interaction variable Housing Bubble × Spread, in column 1, to examine whether the predic-
tive power of initial spreads differs between housing bubbles and normal periods. We find 
that Housing Bubble x Spread is significant, indicating that that initial spreads have more 
predictive power during housing bubbles. Thus, investors seem to be more cautious in rely-
ing on credit ratings during the housing bubble periods.
In columns 3 and 4 we present the results for the AAA sample. We report similar 
results; however, the effect of Housing Bubble × Spread is much larger for this sample. For 
example, a 1 bp higher origination spread increases the odds of AAA-rated MBS down-
grade by 13.0% in a house bubble period, compared to a 0.4% increase in these odds during 
 S. Y. Deku et al.
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a normal period. The results for the non-AAA investment grade sample, presented in col-
umns 5 and 6 are also very similar to the full sample. However, the result differs for the 
non-investment grade (column 7), or lowest quality, MBS. Here we find that Housing Bub-
ble significantly predicts the future downgrades. It shows that non-investment grade MBS 
are of worse quality if they are originated in a housing bubble period. We also do not find 
Housing Bubble × Spread to be significant. This result shows that the predictive power of 
spreads on the lowest quality MBS does not differ during the housing bubble periods.
3.3  Predicting the magnitude of the downgrade
The results presented so far show that the predictive power of initial yield spreads is higher 
for AAA-rated MBS bonds. We take our analysis further to examine whether this observed 
relationship varies with the magnitude of the downgrade within the AAA category. This 
may enable us to observe whether predictability power of initial yield spreads for the bonds 
that carry the same risk differed during the bubble periods.
To do so, we create a new categorical dependent variable Downgrade Mag, which cap-
tures the magnitude of the downgrade. Downgrade Mag is equal to the rounded average 
downward adjustment of the three credit rating agencies. For example, if an AAA tranche 
is downgraded two notches by Moody’s (to AA), two notches by Standard & Poor’s (AA) 
and three notches by Fitch (AA−), then we record the rounded average Downgrade Mag as 
two for this tranche.
Following Lugo (2014) we estimate an ordered logit regression and modify the baseline 
model as follows:
We present the estimation results in Table 4 for Credit Bubble in columns 1 and 2 and for 
Housing Bubble in columns 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 3, where interaction terms are not 
included, we find Spread to be positive and statistically significant. Thus, AAA bonds with 
higher prices at origination are more likely to be downgraded by a larger magnitude. This 
result shows that initial yield spreads do not only predict the likelihood of downgrade, but 
also the downgrade magnitude of least risky MBS tranches. In other words, investors seem 
to have the capability to identify riskier AAA bonds and adjust the price accordingly. We 
find that Credit Bubble is also positive and significant, showing that AAA bonds issued 
during the credit growth period of 2005 and June 2007 suffered more severe downgrades. 
Hence, these AAA bonds were riskier compared to AAA bonds issued pre-2005 period.
In column 2 of Table 4, we introduce Credit Bubble × Spread and find a positive and 
significant coefficient. This finding indicates that origination spreads predict future down-
grades more forcefully if a bond is issued during a credit bubble period. Similar to above 
results, Housing Bubble is not significant (column 3) for the AAA sample. However, we 
find that the interaction variable Housing Bubble × Spread is significant, showing that ini-
tial spreads have more power in predicting the magnitude of future downgrades during 
housing bubbles.
DowngradeMagi =훽0 + 훽1Spreadi + 훽2Bubblei,c + 훽3Bubblec,t,i × Spreadi
+ 훽4WeightedAverageLifei
 S. Y. Deku et al.
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3.4  Robustness tests
In this section, we check the robustness of our reported results. First, we estimate the mod-
els with a more uniform sample, using Residential MBS (RMBS) issues only, which con-
stitute 80.1% of our data. Using a homogenous sample may give us more consistent results. 
The corresponding results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for the credit and housing bub-
bles, respectively. The direction and statistical significance of the results are almost identi-
cal to the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the whole sample. The only difference in 
results for the RMBS sample is that the coefficient of Spread becomes statistically signifi-
cant also for the non-investment grade sample. We find that initial yield spreads are power-
ful predictors of future performance also for the lowest quality RMBS, especially when the 
estimations are run with the housing bubble variable (column 8 of Table 6). We present 
estimation results for Downgrade Mag for the RMBS sample in Table 7. The results for the 
restricted sample are similar to what we have reported for the full sample. The magnitude 
of downgrades is larger for AAA RMBS bonds that have higher spreads at origination and 
for bonds that are issued during the credit bubble (column 1) and housing bubble (column 
3) periods. Spreads at origination predict the future downgrades of RMBS more power-
fully if a bond is issued during a credit bubble (column 2) but not in a housing bubble 
Table 4  Predictive power of initial yield spreads and downgrade magnitude
This table reports ordered logit regressions of the Downgrades Magnitude of European MBS tranches on 
the log of initial yield spreads and credit ratings. The sample includes all AAA-rated floating tranches 
issued between 1999 and June 2007. Credit Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the boom period 
of 2005 and the first half of 2007. Housing Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the housing bub-
ble period in the issuance country. Spread is the quoted spreads at issuance in excess of the benchmark, i.e. 
Euribor. Weighted Average Life of a bond is computed as the weighted average time until each monetary 
unit of principal remains outstanding. Credit Rating is a factor variable controlling for the fixed effect of 
individual credit rating indicators at the tranche level. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance 
periods annually. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spread 0.038*** 0.009 0.036*** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Credit bubble 4.324*** 2.459***
(0.841) (0.933)
Credit bubble × spread 0.080***
(0.025)
Housing bubble − 0.252 − 2.413***
(0.241) (0.499)
Housing bubble × spread 0.105***
(0.021)
Weighted average life 1.274*** 1.162*** 1.270*** 1.083***
(0.124) (0.098) (0.112) (0.135)
Controls for
 Years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1574 1574 1574 1574
Pseudo R-squared 0.146 0.150 0.146 0.156
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(column 4) periods. Overall, our results presented above for the full sample are confirmed 
by the results obtained from the RMBS sample.
A second issue is that the analysis presented so far splits the sample into credit or hous-
ing bubble subsamples. Although all countries in our sample experienced the credit bub-
ble, housing bubble periods vary by country. We also observe that the credit and housing 
bubbles overlap to some extent in some countries (see Fig. 1). Hence, to test the validity of 
our results using a more stringent criterion for asset bubbles, we estimate the models using 
an alternative indicator which incorporates both credit and housing bubbles. Accordingly, 
Bubble equals to 1 if a deal is issued during the boom period of 2005 and the first half of 
2007 and a housing bubble period in a given country, and 0 otherwise. The results (pre-
sented in Table 8) are more in line with our initial findings from the housing bubble base-
line models. We find that Spread positively predicts the likelihood of downgrade. Bubble is 
insignificant, indicating that the probability of downgrade does not differ between the com-
bined bubbles and normal periods. We still find that the coefficient of Bubble x Spread to 
be positive and statistically significant, showing the predictive power of initial spreads dur-
ing bubbles. Similarly, for the lowest quality MBS (column 7), we confirm our results that 
Bubble significantly predicts the future downgrades of non-investment grade tranches and 
that informative power of the corresponding spreads does not differ during bubble periods.
Table 7  Predictive power of initial RMBS yield spreads and downgrade magnitude
This table reports ordered logit regressions of the Downgrades Magnitude of European RMBS tranches 
on the log of initial yield spreads and credit ratings. The sample includes all AAA-rated floating tranches 
issued between 1999 and June 2007. Credit Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the boom period 
of 2005 and the first half of 2007. Housing Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the bubble period 
in the issuance country. Spread is the quoted spreads at issuance in excess of the benchmark, i.e. Euribor. 
Weighted Average Life of a bond is computed as the weighted average time until each monetary unit of 
principal remains outstanding. Credit Rating is a factor variable controlling for the fixed effect of individ-
ual credit rating indicators at the tranche level. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance periods 
annually. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spread 0.057*** 0.014 0.057*** 0.011
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
Credit bubble 4.558*** 2.654***
(0.871) (0.985)
Credit bubble × spread 0.086***
(0.026)
Housing bubble − 0.113 − 2.475***
(0.326) (0.594)
Housing bubble × spread 0.112***
(0.023)
Weighted average life 1.204*** 1.095*** 1.203*** 1.067***
(0.125) (0.132) (0.125) (0.134)
Controls for
 Years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1412 1412 1412 1412
Pseudo R-squared 0.142 0.151 0.142 0.146
 S. Y. Deku et al.
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Third, we control for signals that may indicate higher information asymmetries for 
a particular MBS. In particular, we account for that the number of assigned ratings per 
tranche (each tranche is rated by at least one of the top 3 global credit rating agencies: 
Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch). Issuers are not required to report all ratings; 
however, ratings from all three agencies suggest more transparency while ratings from 
Table 9  Predictive power of initial yield spreads during credit bubbles: controlling for rating disagreements 
and rating shopping
This table reports logit regressions of the Downgrades of European MBS tranches on the log of initial yield 
spreads and credit ratings. The sample includes all rated floating tranches issued between 1999 and June 
2007. Credit Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the boom period of 2005 and the first half of 
2007. Spread is the quoted spreads at issuance in excess of the benchmark, i.e. Euribor. CRA is the number 
of credit rating assigned by different rating agencies (CRA = 1 is the base). Rating Gap equals the maxi-
mum rating difference between the credit ratings assigned by different rating agencies (Rating Gap = 0 is 
the base). Weighted Average Life of a bond is computed as the weighted average time until each monetary 
unit of principal remains outstanding. Credit Rating is a factor variable controlling for the fixed effect of 
individual credit rating indicators at the tranche level. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance 
periods annually. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Constant is not reported
Full sample AAA Investment grade 
excluding AAA 
Non-Investment 
grade (< BBB−)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spread 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.057*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.006** 0.004** 0.006*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Credit bubble 4.158*** 3.840*** 5.223*** 2.745** 4.487*** 2.818*** 2.517*** 3.286***
(0.567) (0.565) (1.084) (1.156) (0.779) (0.757) (0.744) (1.274)
Credit bub-
ble × spread
0.007*** 0.115*** 0.027*** − 0.002
(0.002) (0.030) (0.007) (0.003)
CRA = 2 1.127*** 0.446 1.308*** − 0.241 0.805*** 0.781* − 0.091 0.738
(0.099) (0.317) (0.147) (0.428) (0.153) (0.412) (0.329) (0.753)
CRA = 3 0.452 0.637* − 0.162 0.173 0.686* 0.938** 0.705 2.024**
(0.299) (0.333) (0.447) (0.428) (0.352) (0.435) (0.788) (0.857)
Rating gap = 1 0.608* 0.071 0.165 1.134 0.741** − 0.030 1.939** 0.009
(0.318) (0.128) (0.450) (0.788) (0.377) (0.138) (0.888) (0.412)
Rating gap = 2 0.075 0.329 1.357 0.000 0.254 0.031 0.029
(0.127) (0.268) (0.919) (.) (0.288) (0.413) (0.764)
Rating gap = 3 0.346 0.432 0.288 − 0.371 0.043 2.957***
(0.261) (0.525) (0.275) (0.455) (0.751) (1.118)
Weighted aver-
age life
0.358 1.132*** 1.145*** − 0.295 0.785*** 2.864*** − 0.117
(0.492) (0.101) (0.168) (0.461) (0.152) (1.049) (0.333)
Controls for
 Credit ratings Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4192 4192 1574 1574 2341 2341 262 262
Pseudo 
R-squared
0.234 0.241 0.279 0.296 0.241 0.265 0.280 0.281
 S. Y. Deku et al.
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either one or two may indicate suppression of negative ratings. The information sup-
pression tendency increases tail risk or the likelihood of extreme returns (Jirasakuldech 
et al. 2011).There may also be rating disagreements where bonds may be assigned dis-
similar ratings by different agencies. Such bonds may carry a higher degree of asymmet-
ric information and be more opaque for investors to assess. To control for the severity of 
Table 10  Predictive power of initial yield spreads during housing bubbles: controlling for rating disagree-
ments and rating shopping
This table reports logit regressions of the Downgrades of European MBS tranches on the log of initial yield 
spreads and credit ratings. The sample includes all rated floating tranches issued between 1999 and June 
2007. Housing Bubble equals to 1 if the deal is issued during the housing bubble period in the issuance 
country. Spread is the quoted spreads at issuance in excess of the benchmark, i.e. Euribor. CRA is the num-
ber of credit rating assigned by different rating agencies (CRA = 1 is the base). Rating Gap equals the maxi-
mum rating difference between the credit ratings assigned by different rating agencies (Rating Gap = 0 is 
the base). Weighted Average Life of a bond is computed as the weighted average time until each monetary 
unit of principal remains outstanding. Credit Rating is a factor variable controlling for the fixed effect of 
individual credit rating indicators at the tranche level. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance 
periods annually. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Constant is not reported
Full sample AAA Investment grade exclud-
ing AAA 
Non-Investment grade 
(< BBB−)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spread 0.007*** 0.005** 0.058*** − 0.001 0.011*** 0.005** 0.004** 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Housing 
bubble
− 0.157 − 0.558** 0.091 − 2.525*** − 0.267 − 1.287*** 0.850 0.336
(0.207) (0.223) (0.240) (0.519) (0.229) (0.339) (0.518) (1.528)
Housing bub-
ble × spread
0.006*** 0.125*** 0.016*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.023) (0.004) (0.005)
CRA = 2 1.121*** 0.427 1.308*** − 0.284 0.793*** 0.793** − 0.114 0.642
(0.099) (0.295) (0.147) (0.421) (0.154) (0.367) (0.345) (0.708)
CRA = 3 0.440 0.615* − 0.151 0.145 0.673* 0.931** 0.662 1.757**
(0.301) (0.316) (0.444) (0.422) (0.354) (0.394) (0.732) (0.834)
Rating gap = 1 0.612* 0.073 0.167 0.447 0.753** 0.007 1.786** − 0.016
(0.319) (0.127) (0.449) (1.061) (0.380) (0.138) (0.855) (0.415)
Rating gap = 2 0.081 0.348 0.024 0.268 − 0.025 0.120
(0.127) (0.266) (0.140) (0.283) (0.418) (0.782)
Rating gap = 3 0.343 0.315 0.307 − 0.420 0.151 2.774***
(0.259) (0.504) (0.280) (0.473) (0.775) (1.015)
Weighted 
average life
0.340 1.112*** 1.329 1.074*** − 0.327 0.785*** 2.766*** − 0.089
(0.498) (0.100) (0.924) (0.154) (0.466) (0.153) (1.027) (0.353)
Controls for
 Credit rat-
ings
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4192 4192 1574 1574 2341 2341 262 262
Pseudo 
R-squared
0.234 0.239 0.279 0.305 0.242 0.253 0.290 0.290
The predictive strength of MBS yield spreads during asset bubbles 
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information asymmetries, we re-run the estimations including a set of dummy variables 
capturing the impact of these factors on spread. Accordingly, we utilise credit rating 
agencies (CRA ), which is the number of credit ratings assigned by different rating agen-
cies to a tranche (CRA = 1 is the base). We also use Rating Gap, the numeric difference 
between the highest and lowest rating assigned by different rating agencies to the same 
tranche (Rating Gap = 0 is the base). The results for the credit bubble are presented in 
Table 9. In general, the results are consistent with our initial findings. We observe that 
MBS, especially investment grade tranches, rated by two rating agencies were more 
likely to be downgraded. We also find that, for non-investment grade MBS, a larger rat-
ing difference (i.e. three notches) between the rating agencies predicts the future down-
grades. In Table 10, we present results for housing bubble and our results are consistent 
with the results of the baseline estimations.
We also address the potential endogeneity bias that may arise due to the credit ratings’ 
impact on MBS spread. In our setting, we use composite credit ratings as an indicator that 
captures the expected default frequency of tranches. However, it could also be argued that 
the credit rating of individual tranches is a determinant of the spread of the bonds at issu-
ance. To check the robustness of our results we utilise a two-stage estimation methodology 
that addresses the potential endogeneity bias between the credit ratings and initial spread. 
Following the MBS pricing literature (Deku et al. 2019; Fabozzi and Vink 2012a) we esti-
mate spread by using a set of instruments and other control variables via the following 
model at the first stage:
where Spread is the log of quoted spread at issuance in excess of the pricing benchmark. 
Weighted Average Life is the log of weighted average time until each monetary unit of 
principal is repaid. Due to moral hazard concerns, an incentive-compatible contract would 
involve the issuer to retain riskier tranches, while selling safer ones (Palia and Sopranzetti 
2004). Therefore, we hypothesise that spreads account for tranche retention (Retained) as 
a moderator factor regarding the misalignment of interests between investors and issuers. 
Retained equals to 1 if at least one tranche is retained by the issuer, and 0 otherwise. Subor-
dination is computed as the value of tranches in the same deal that have an equal or higher 
rating than the given tranche as a fraction of the total deal value. Tranche Size is the natural 
logarithm of the principal value of the relevant tranche. Ratings/Tranches is the ratio of the 
number of unique ratings in a deal to the total number of tranches in a deal (indicating the 
level of information asymmetries for a particular deal). Collateral equals to 1 for residen-
tial mortgages, and 0 otherwise. Collateral Country is a set of dummy variables indicating 
the country where the underlying mortgages are issued. Credit Ratings are a set of dummy 
variables indicating the credit rating of the tranche at the issuance. Year is a set of dummy 
variables capturing the effects of the macro environment. In the first stage model we use 
Retained, Subordination, Tranche Size, Collateral, Collateral Country and Rating/Tranches 
as instruments. Subsequently, we estimate the main model in the second stage by using the 
predicted spread derived from first stage estimates. We present the results of the second 
stage estimations in Tables 11 and 12 for credit and housing bubbles, respectively. For both 
types of bubbles, we find that Predicted Spread is statistically significant and positive for 
Spreadi =훽0 + 훽1WeightedAverageLifei + 훽2Retainedi + 훽3Subordinationi
+ 훽4TrancheSizei + 훽5Ratings∕Tranchesi + 훽6Collaterali
+
C−1∑
c=1
훽k × CollateralCountryi +
K−1∑
k=1
훽k × CreditRatingk,i +
Y−1∑
y=1
훽y × Yeary,i
 S. Y. Deku et al.
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the full, AAA and non-investment grade samples. We also find that the coefficients of the 
interaction variables Credit Bubble x Predicted Spread and Housing Bubble x Predicted 
Spread are still significant and positive. Overall, these results show that our initial findings 
remain unchanged and the potential impact of endogeneity bias on our results is minimal.
4  Results from ML methods
In this section we present the results of the ML methods we have employed. Following 
the literature, to identify parameters for estimations and validate our findings, we split our 
MBS data sample into two parts as the training sub-sample and testing sub-sample7 (e.g. 
Chen, 2011; Beutel et  al., 2019).8 We focus on the full, AAA and non-AAA investment 
grade samples (similar to the results presented in Tables 2, 3 above) with the correspond-
ing testing sub-samples containing 838, 315 and 521 observations, respectively.9
4.1  Classification trees
We present results for the classification trees analysis in Fig. 2 for full (a), AAA (b) non-
AAA investment grade (c) samples from left to right, respectively. For the full sample in 
Fig. 2a, the first critical criterion is whether an MBS was issued before 2005. We observe 
that only 15% of the MBS issued prior to 2005 were downgraded, whereas the overall 
Year < 2005
Av.Life < 1.1
Year < 2006
Av.Life >= 1.5 Spread < 2.7
yes no
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14
28 29
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30 31
N−Down
.59  .41
100%
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.44  .56
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N−Down
.78  .22
13%
Y−Down
.35  .65
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.52  .48
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Y−Down
.32  .68
2%
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.28  .72
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(a)
Rattle: Exploratory Downgrade Decision Tree − Full Sample
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Spread < 2.5
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Av.Life < 0.91
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yes no
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7
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29%
Y−Down
.35  .65
43%
N−Down
.51  .49
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23%
(b)
Rattle: Exploratory Downgrade Decision Tree − AAA
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1
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(c)
Rattle: Exploratory Downgrade Decision Tree − Excluding AAA
Fig. 2  MBS downgrade decision trees for full sample (a), AAA (b) and excluding AAA (c). Notes: Each 
ellipse shaped body in the tree hierarchy is its Node. Every Node is numbered and the closer it is to the top 
of the tree, its root, the more classi_cation value it typically contains. Trees are pruned with penalty param-
eter obtained for corresponding testing sub-sample. Therefore, gaps in the Node numbers are due to the tree 
pruning process. Nodes at the very bottom of the tree are often referred to as tree terminal Nodes. N-Down 
denotes not downgraded MBS outcomes, while Y-Down denotes downgraded MBS outcomes
7 This is based on the random split of a relevant sample and sub-samples: 80% of the data for training and 
20% testing sub-samples, respectively.
8 We obtain comparable (e.g. Tanaka et al. 2016) and/or superior (e.g. Tanaka et al. 2019) prediction accu-
racy results to other relevant investigations. We employ functionality of the caret R package and ten-fold 
Cross Validation procedures for tuning our parameters.
9 We do not perform analysis on the non-investment grade MBS separately here, since this sample can be 
argued as relatively small for unbiased inference with purely data-driven ML approaches.
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probability of downgrade is higher for MBS issued 2005 onwards. This result points to the 
Credit Bubble in the pre-crisis period of 2005-2007. For MBS issued during the bubble 
period, we can also highlight that there is a portion of securities with relatively low down-
grade likelihood. These are 13% of the sample (issued after 2005) with lower Weighted 
Average Life, signalling a relatively lower interest rate risk as the next important determi-
nant of the MBS to be not-downgraded. On the other hand, securities issued from 2005 
onwards, and with higher than or equal to the ML selected threshold for the interest rate 
risk in Node 7 of Fig.  2a, have 65% observed likelihood to be downgraded. It is worth 
noting that there is a small interest rate risk “cluster” of MBS issued in 2005 emerging 
from the Node 14 in Fig. 2a.10 Finally, there are two terminal nodes in the full sample tree 
indicating that MBS issued in 2006 and 2007 (constituting 36% of our sample as shown by 
Node 15 in Fig. 2a have the highest downgrade likelihood. A sizable portion of these MBS 
have higher initial yield spreads with the highest observed downgrade likelihood of 76%. 
Overall, the full sample tree offers a clear decision algorithm on the growing pattern of the 
well-documented speculations with MBS during the Credit Bubble and that initial yield 
spreads as well as Weighted Average Life contain valuable information in predicting the 
downgrade outcomes.
The full sample tree in Fig. 2a does not identify credit ratings as a valuable determinant 
of the MBS downgrade. However, for the AAA sample in Fig. 2b, the accuracy of the over-
all classification tree is 79.81% (79.75%) in comparison to the accuracy for the full sample 
tree of 76.29% (75.95%).11 We also observe a higher ranked role of initial yield spreads in 
predicting the MBS downgrade outcomes. Moreover, ML suggests that MBS downgrade 
trend begins from 2004 and prior to our Credit Bubble dummy variable employed in the 
logistic regressions. This is an indication of Housing Bubble, which is also found to be 
more evident for the AAA sample in Table 3 and Sect. 3.2. Results show that 29% of the 
AAA sample issued from 2004 have 81% observed likelihood of not to be downgraded if 
they have an initial yield spread below the determined level in node 3 of Fig. 2b. Following 
the AAA tree in Fig. 2b further down to its terminal nodes, we can again observe previ-
ously identified cluster of MBS with higher interest rate risk in node 29 and pattern of the 
developing Credit Bubble as shown by node 7. However, both are conditional on the higher 
Spread in node 3 of Fig. 2b. Therefore, this is a strong indication of Spread classification 
value and its interaction with Credit Bubble for the AAA sample. The last tree in Fig. 2c 
presents the results for the non-AAA investment grade sample. We find a decline in over-
all downgrade classification accuracy to 73.65% (72.33%). We observe similar predictions 
where MBS is more likely to be downgraded during the Credit Bubble period and also if 
they have a higher Weighted Average Life (or carry a higher interest rate risk) than ML 
identified threshold in Node 3 of Fig. 2c. In sum, the exploratory classification tree analysis 
11 Methods employed in this section do not operate on the dimensions of the statistical significance and 
measures of explained variance in the dependent variable by the variance of independent variables, such 
as  R2. Instead, interpretation of the modelling power is performed comparing model accuracy gains, and 
inference validation is confirmed with training and testing sub-samples accuracy comparisons. We provide 
accuracies for testing sub-samples in brackets.
10 We let selected algorithms to learn over the variables (features) we used in the logistic regressions and 
articulate emergence of this cluster due to the absence of feature engineering component in our analysis. 
Feature engineering is a data science procedure of data transformations to achieve higher classification 
accuracy power with ML methods. This procedure is common in the relevant investigations (Beutel et al. 
2019; Tanaka et al. 2016, 2019).
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provides an empirical confirmation of the predictive strength of initial yield spread and 
suggests that Spread is the dominant predictor of the downgrade of AAA rated MBS.
5  Naïve Bayes
In Fig. 3 we present results for the naïve Bayes analysis. Here we restrict our analysis to 
the Credit Boom period since all exploratory classification trees presented above highlight 
this period consistently. Results clearly show that all nonparametric probability density 
functions (PDF) for the downgraded MBS are located more to the right of the initial yield 
Spread axes in comparison to not-downgraded. This is observed for all MBS samples (full, 
AAA and non-AAA investment grade); however, with different degree of the shift towards 
higher initial yield spreads. In Fig. 3, we also illustrate similar classification for Weighted 
Average Life and find less evident patterns. Hence, initial yield spread provides visually 
more distinguishable positions of PDFs for downgrade (and no-downgrade) outcomes than 
Weighted Average Life.
5.1  Support vector machines (SVM)
We present results for SVM in Fig. 4. Here we position Credit Bubble downgrade and 
no- downgrade outcomes conditional on initial yield spread and weighted average life, 
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and let the SVM algorithm determine a decision boundary and areas of the respective 
downgrade outcomes. We find clear nonlinear patterns for all illustrated sub-samples 
and observe that the higher the initial yield spread and the interest rate risk, the higher 
the downgrade likelihood of a given tranche. For the AAA sample, SVM achieves the 
highest accuracy of 72.6% (73.59%) for the linear boundary and 76.62% (76.44%) for 
the nonlinear boundary with the most explicit patterns, and visually differentiable posi-
tions of downgraded and not-downgraded tranches. Moreover, allowing for nonlinear 
boundary, we are able to visualise a separate cluster of the downgraded tranches with 
higher interest rate risk, previously identified with classification trees and highlighted 
for AAA sample in Fig. 2b. Full sample accuracy results are lower at 66.71% [66.44%] 
for linear and 67.96% (67.11%) for nonlinear. Removing the AAA sub-sample from the 
full sample lowers the SVM accuracy further to 63.38% [56.83%] and 65.86% [59.01%] 
for linear and nonlinear plots in Fig.  4, respectively. Overall, results based on SVM 
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show additional and explicit evidence that predictive potency of initial yield spreads is 
the highest for AAA sample during the asset bubble periods.
5.2  Random forest and gradient boosting
Results of the RF algorithm are presented in Fig. 5. We obtain the highest accuracy for 
modelling with RF achieving 81.72% accuracy on the training sub-sample and 80.58% 
on the testing sub-samples. We observe that initial yield spread is the second most 
important variable, after issuance year, for our RF accuracy accomplishment. Reflecting 
on previous classification trees results in Fig. 2, we argue that asset bubble periods con-
tribute the most to modelling downgrades. We also note that credit ratings are the least 
important variable for our RF framework (similar to classification trees in Fig. 2). How-
ever, following analyses conducted in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, it is also worthwhile exploring 
gains due to variable interactions and unpacking the value of Spread during the asset 
bubble periods. This can be implemented with GB algorithm, another tree-based clas-
sification method. GB attempts to build trees so that every new tree corrects the error 
of the previous one (i.e. step by step learning), while RF builds each tree independently 
with a random sample of the participating data (generalisation at the end of the learn-
ing). This suggests that GB can be more delicate to handle, and it is more sensitive to 
the choice of parameters than RF; however, its step by step tree building nature can 
supply an interactions matrix of the independent variables.12 From the results in Fig. 5, 
we observe the highest accuracy gains from interactions of issuance year and Spread 
variables with the Weighted Average Life variable. Initial yield spread and credit rating 
interactions as well as issuance year and Spread interactions provide the second-best 
accuracy gains. This finding confirms our baseline regression results in Tables 2 and 3 
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that initial yield spreads’ predictive potency during the asset bubble periods varies with 
credit ratings at origination (Table 13).
6  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether the predictive power of initial MBS yield spreads 
varies with the financial cycle using a cross-country sample of 4203 MBS tranches. We 
find that initial yield spreads of MBS incorporate more information than credit ratings and 
predict the future downgrades even after conditioning on initial credit ratings. The predic-
tive power of spreads is higher during credit and housing bubbles. It is also stronger for the 
least risky AAA-rated MBS. However, for non-investment MBS, predictive power of initial 
yield spreads shows no evidence of variation with issuance levels or the credit cycle. We 
also find that initial yield spreads capture the magnitude of the downgrade, especially dur-
ing asset bubbles.
Overall, when valuing MBS bonds investors seem to rely on credit ratings more dur-
ing the normal economic periods by not adjusting spreads. In contrast, during the bub-
ble periods, they reflect risk sentiments in the initial yield spreads in excess of the risk 
indicated by assigned credit ratings. Investors also seem to be more cautious when pricing 
non-AAA investment grade bonds and are less likely to rely on credit ratings even dur-
ing the normal economic periods. For riskiest non-investment grade bonds, the predictive 
power of spreads does not differ between the bubble and normal periods. We also show 
that initial yield spreads of MBS incorporated more information than credit ratings and, 
therefore, investors seem not to solely rely on credit ratings when assessing MBS quality. 
Our results are robust after accounting for both types of asset bubbles, the severity of infor-
mation asymmetries in MBS and possible endogeneity bias that may arise due to model-
ling approach. Furthermore, results obtained from ML techniques, which are utilised for 
the first time in this strand of the literature, confirm our original findings.
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